Summary
- Ofcom chair Sir Ian Cheshire has begun a review of the regulator’s structure and working arrangements.
- The government has separately requested capability changes, faster online-safety enforcement, clearer performance measures, and lower regulatory costs.
- Any reorganisation must reconcile operational speed and specialist expertise with Ofcom’s statutory independence and broad existing remit.
Ofcom chair Sir Ian Cheshire has begun a review of the regulator’s structure and ways of working as its responsibilities expand beyond communications and broadcasting into online safety and the oversight of large digital platforms.
The Financial Times reported that the review followed Cheshire’s arrival in June and would examine whether Ofcom is organised appropriately for its enlarged remit. The regulator has not published standalone terms of reference, and the precise organisational options under consideration remain undisclosed.
Science and technology secretary Liz Kendall had already asked Cheshire to give early attention to changes in Ofcom’s structures and management. A later government letter called for an urgent assessment of its capabilities, stronger enforcement reporting, and further changes to its working methods as ministers prepare additional restrictions affecting children’s access to social media and AI chatbots.
The exercise reaches beyond an ordinary management reshuffle because Ofcom must enforce politically contested rules against some of the world’s largest technology companies while retaining its independence from ministers. At the same time, the government expects it to support economic growth, reduce administrative burdens, and show clearer evidence of performance.
A regulator built across several markets
Ofcom’s remit spans telecoms networks, spectrum, postal services, television, radio, video-sharing platforms, and online safety. Those areas involve different legislation, technical systems, market structures, and enforcement methods, making it difficult to organise the regulator around a single operating model.
Telecoms regulation often relies on market analysis, engineering evidence, price controls, and long investment cycles, while online-safety supervision requires assessments of recommendation systems, content processes, age assurance, risk controls, and the design choices made by fast-changing platforms.
Simply adding more staff to existing divisions may therefore leave the underlying coordination problem unresolved. A platform investigation can involve data protection, product design, artificial intelligence, child safety, economic incentives, and technical auditing, while the evidence may sit across several teams or outside Ofcom altogether.
The government’s June priorities letter asked Ofcom to strengthen performance reporting through consistent indicators, update its framework agreement with the department, review its approach to risk, and contribute to a 25 per cent reduction in the administrative cost of regulation.
Those demands can pull in different directions. Faster investigations may require more specialist staff and greater information-gathering capacity, while reducing business burdens may favour narrower requests and fewer reporting obligations. Greater ministerial engagement can improve coordination, but it can also create concern that operational priorities are becoming entangled with political pressure.
Online enforcement raises the stakes
The government has placed particular emphasis on the implementation of the Online Safety Act, telling Ofcom to use the full range of its enforcement powers and respond more quickly to emerging harms. Ministers have also requested an assessment of age-assurance methods and additional work connected with proposed restrictions for users under 16.
Age assurance illustrates the practical difficulty. A system must distinguish between adults and children with sufficient accuracy, avoid excluding legitimate users who lack conventional identity documents, minimise the collection of personal information, and withstand attempts at circumvention.
No single team can answer all of those questions. The work requires technical testing, privacy expertise, behavioural research, legal interpretation, platform knowledge, and an understanding of how services may redesign products in response to regulation.
Enforcement also becomes harder when technology changes during an investigation. Ofcom must gather evidence robust enough to withstand legal challenge, yet a platform may alter an algorithm, feature, or policy before the case is complete. Speed is therefore necessary, although decisions made too quickly may be overturned or fail to address the underlying system.
A structural review could produce clearer accountability around individual duties, shared technical functions supporting several policy areas, or stronger links between supervision and enforcement. It could also expose duplication or gaps created as new responsibilities were added to an organisation originally built for a different communications market.
However, reorganisations carry costs of their own. Senior attention moves towards reporting lines, job boundaries, and internal recruitment, while investigations and consultations must continue. If the design process becomes prolonged, it could weaken delivery during the period when ministers are demanding visible action.
Cheshire’s business background may encourage closer attention to operational performance, although Ofcom is not a commercial company and cannot measure success through revenue or margin. Its results include market access, service quality, consumer protection, competition, regulatory predictability, and enforcement that changes behaviour without producing avoidable legal uncertainty.
The relationship with government will need particular care. Kendall’s letter acknowledged Ofcom’s regulatory independence while also asking for more frequent performance discussions, closer policy engagement, and early consultation over future plans of work. Clear publication of objectives, evidence, and outcomes will be needed to show where ministerial priorities end and independent regulatory judgement begins.
Ofcom has not set out what the review will change, which functions are in scope, or when alterations might take effect. Until it does, the more useful test will be visible in its work: whether investigations move more quickly, decisions withstand scrutiny, specialist capability improves, and an expanding remit produces clearer accountability rather than a larger organisational chart.




