Summary

• Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence signed a letter of intent with ICEYE and Nokia on 22 October.
• The companies’ existing programme proposes government-owned low Earth orbit satellite systems, including ground infrastructure and terminals.
• The agreement remains exploratory, with no disclosed Ukrainian procurement contract, constellation size, financing or operational start date.

Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has signed a letter of intent with Finnish technology companies ICEYE and Nokia to explore satellite communications infrastructure under Ukrainian control, extending a recently announced European partnership into discussions with a prospective government customer.

The agreement was announced on 22 October during a visit to Ukraine by Finland’s prime minister. It provides a basis for examining potential cooperation in space technology, particularly the development of secure satellite connectivity for defence requirements.

ICEYE and Nokia established their broader partnership on 1 October to develop low Earth orbit satellite communications systems for government customers. Their proposed approach would give participating states ownership and control over spacecraft, ground infrastructure and user terminals.

The new Ukrainian agreement identifies an organisation interested in exploring that technology, but it does not establish a procurement contract. Neither company has announced an investment value, number of satellites, launch schedule or date for operational service dedicated to Ukraine.

Those distinctions are important because satellite connectivity depends on infrastructure that takes considerable engineering and investment to establish. A government may express interest in controlling a communications network long before the technical requirements, financing and operating arrangements have been settled.

Communications resilience reaches into orbit

Satellite networks can provide connectivity when terrestrial cables, radio infrastructure or other communications services are unavailable or disrupted. In areas affected by military operations, the availability of alternative communications paths can help organisations maintain access to information and coordinate activity.

Low Earth orbit systems use spacecraft operating much closer to the planet than traditional geostationary communications satellites. Their relatively low altitude can support connections with reduced signal travel time, although maintaining coverage requires coordination across satellites moving relative to the Earth’s surface.

A usable network also depends on suitable terminals, communications capacity, ground stations and software controlling how connections are established and maintained.

The ICEYE–Nokia programme proposes systems designed for national ownership rather than relying exclusively on externally operated commercial services. For a government customer, greater control could influence decisions about capacity allocation, security arrangements, network management and the infrastructure available to its agencies.

However, ownership does not eliminate technical dependencies. Satellites must be manufactured and launched, ground equipment needs continuing maintenance, and software may rely on specialist components or expertise provided by external suppliers.

A state seeking greater control would therefore need to determine which functions it intends to operate directly and which would remain covered by supplier contracts. The ability to inspect, maintain and replace components may be as relevant as the formal ownership of the spacecraft.

Ground facilities create additional responsibilities because the service depends on terrestrial infrastructure even though its connections pass through space. Their security, location, availability and connections to existing networks all influence the resilience of the wider system.

Two suppliers bring different capabilities

ICEYE has established a business operating synthetic aperture radar satellites for intelligence and Earth observation. Its existing capabilities include spacecraft manufacturing and the delivery of satellite missions for government and commercial customers.

Radar observation and broadband communications are technically different services. A radar payload collects measurements by transmitting signals towards the Earth’s surface, while a communications satellite carries equipment intended to receive and relay information between users and network infrastructure.

Experience in spacecraft engineering and mission operations can support development of either application, but the equipment and technical requirements cannot be treated as interchangeable.

Nokia contributes its background in telecommunications networks, connectivity software and supporting infrastructure. The companies intend to combine their experience in developing systems for defence, border security, emergency services and other government requirements.

Their October partnership announcement identified 2028 as an expected year for launching the first communications satellites associated with the wider programme. That target does not establish that Ukraine will receive a dedicated system in 2028, nor that an agreement to build one has already been reached.

Techopia previously covered the initial ICEYE–Nokia sovereign satellite partnership. The 22 October development is distinct because Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence has now signed a letter of intent to explore the technology with the companies.

No new completed satellite constellation or communications service was unveiled alongside that agreement.

Ukraine provides a demanding operating environment

Ukraine has relied on multiple communications systems during the war, while attacks against terrestrial infrastructure and the need for connectivity across dispersed locations have increased the importance of network resilience.

A future satellite service could provide additional communications routes for authorised users where ground infrastructure is damaged or difficult to restore. It would still depend on functioning user equipment, power supplies and the availability of suitable satellite coverage.

Satellite links can also experience interference or disruption, particularly in contested environments. A system’s ability to maintain service depends on its technical design, terminal equipment and the methods used to protect communications against interference and unauthorised access.

The companies describe their proposed systems as secure and sovereign, but have not disclosed a final architecture or independently verified performance under particular electronic warfare conditions.

Consequently, the Ukrainian letter of intent should not be treated as proof that a future service would be immune to disruption or capable of replacing every existing communications network.

For defence organisations, network ownership may also raise questions about information governance. The government would need to establish which agencies can use the service, who controls access permissions and how sensitive communications are protected.

Those arrangements would influence the procurement specification as well as the technical design. A constellation serving several categories of government users may need different access policies and service priorities from one built for a narrower application.

The October announcement does not disclose whether Ukraine is considering an entirely dedicated constellation, participation in a wider programme or another commercial arrangement. Those details remain matters for further discussion.

From exploratory agreement to procurement

ICEYE chief executive and co-founder Rafal Modrzewski said the company had supported Ukraine since 2022 and intended to continue doing so. That earlier involvement provides context for the relationship, but the new agreement concerns prospective satellite communications rather than a confirmed extension of an existing broadband service.

Nokia’s chief geopolitical and government relations officer Mikko Hautala, who also chairs Nokia Defense, described the proposed cooperation as an opportunity to examine how satellite links could strengthen Ukrainian communications resilience.

Neither statement established a binding commitment to supply equipment. Before infrastructure could be delivered, the parties would need to agree technical requirements, responsibility for construction and operation, financing and an acceptable procurement arrangement.

Further work would also involve obtaining suitable spectrum rights, coordinating satellite launches and developing or acquiring user terminals. Those activities can influence the cost and timing of a programme even when the principal suppliers have relevant engineering capabilities.

The companies’ European industrial partnership provides a potential route for governments seeking alternatives to relying entirely on commercially operated satellite networks. Whether that proposition can meet Ukraine’s requirements will depend on the technical and financial arrangements eventually agreed.

The letter of intent marks an additional step in the relationship between ICEYE, Nokia and Ukraine’s defence authorities. Evidence of a delivery programme would require a subsequent contract, defined investment, spacecraft order or published implementation schedule, none of which accompanied the October announcement.