Summary
- IOSCO's 19 November report warns that sufficiently capable quantum computers could threaten cryptography supporting critical financial market functions, with some experts considering a five-year scenario plausible.
- Financial institutions face lengthy migration programmes involving legacy software, suppliers and interconnected infrastructure, while blockchain networks introduce additional coordination difficulties.
- Certes CTO Simon Pamplin calls for cryptographic inventories, crypto agility and stronger organisational control of encryption keys, alongside preparations for post-quantum migration.
Financial institutions must begin preparing for quantum computing threats before the technology becomes capable of compromising widely used cryptography, according to the International Organization of Securities Commissions, which has warned that replacing vulnerable systems could require years of work across interconnected financial infrastructure.
IOSCO published its report, Implications of Quantum Computing on Financial Markets, on 19 November. The organisation, whose members regulate securities markets across more than 130 jurisdictions, identifies risks to secure communications, digital signatures and other functions that depend on established cryptographic methods. It also warns that financial sector preparations remain at an early stage.
The report examines the possibility that sufficiently powerful quantum computers could undermine widely used public-key cryptography within the next five years. That is a potential scenario discussed by industry experts, not a reliable prediction of when the technology will become available. No quantum computer is currently known to possess the capabilities required to defeat these protections at the scale necessary for practical attacks.
IOSCO is encouraging institutions to establish migration plans, test quantum-resistant technologies and engage with suppliers whose software and infrastructure support financial services. The work extends beyond choosing replacement encryption algorithms because cryptography is embedded throughout applications, network connections, authentication systems and transaction processes.
Existing financial systems create substantial migration difficulties
Financial organisations depend on cryptography for several different purposes. Encryption protects sensitive information, while digital signatures and authentication mechanisms help establish whether messages, instructions and transactions originate from legitimate parties.
Some of these functions rely on mathematical techniques that sufficiently capable quantum computers could eventually defeat. RSA and elliptic-curve cryptography are among the established public-key approaches requiring attention, although the implications differ for other forms of encryption and hashing.
Replacing vulnerable mechanisms can be particularly difficult in systems developed over many years. Cryptographic functions may be contained within specialist applications, software libraries, communications protocols or hardware whose design does not allow components to be replaced independently.
Simon Pamplin, chief technology officer at Certes, said the financial industry’s dependence on older infrastructure could make the transition especially demanding.
“Some applications will need extensive redevelopment, others depend on third-party suppliers, and taking critical systems offline simply isn’t an option.”
The operational restrictions are substantial. Financial institutions may need to change authentication or secure communications technology while continuing to process payments, support securities transactions and maintain access to customer information.
A replacement algorithm may be technically available without being supported by every connected application. Where several organisations exchange information through common protocols, upgrades may require agreement about compatible systems and carefully coordinated implementation.
Testing must also examine the possibility that changing cryptographic mechanisms affects processing speed, message sizes or the operation of existing equipment. A technically stronger security method will not provide an acceptable solution if its deployment prevents essential services from operating reliably.
Information stolen today could be exposed later
The possibility of future attacks creates a present-day problem for information that must remain confidential over long periods. Under a strategy commonly described as harvest now, decrypt later, attackers obtain encrypted records today and retain them in the expectation that future computing capabilities will allow the protections to be defeated.
Financial organisations hold information whose sensitivity may persist for many years, including customer identities, transaction records, commercially valuable agreements and confidential communications.
The risk differs according to the information involved. Some records rapidly lose commercial value, while others may require protection for decades. Institutions consequently need to consider the confidentiality period of their data alongside the cryptographic methods used to protect it.
Pamplin argues that organisations should not wait for quantum computers capable of attacking existing systems before examining information already at risk of interception.
“The industry cannot afford to spend the next five years planning how to protect information that is already being exposed.”
Protecting long-lived records may require earlier migration of particular communications and storage systems, even where other applications can be updated over a longer period.
That approach depends on knowing which systems use vulnerable algorithms and which information they protect. A cryptographic inventory can help establish those relationships, but its value depends on the completeness of the records and whether they are kept current as technology changes.
Blockchains face a different coordination problem
IOSCO identifies blockchain networks as particularly challenging environments for post-quantum migration because cryptography is incorporated into their underlying architecture and operating rules.
Public blockchains commonly use digital signatures to authorise transactions and establish control over assets. Replacing those mechanisms may require changes to transaction formats, software and validation procedures, with independent network participants adopting compatible versions.
Unlike a centrally managed financial application, a decentralised network may have no single organisation capable of directing every participant to upgrade. Even where developers agree on a technical solution, implementation can depend on coordination among validators, infrastructure operators, service providers and asset holders.
Changing the signature technology may also affect performance. Post-quantum signature schemes can require more data than established elliptic-curve methods, potentially increasing storage and processing requirements for systems that handle substantial transaction volumes.
Different blockchain architectures will encounter different problems. Public networks, permissioned infrastructure and privately operated ledgers do not share identical governance arrangements or cryptographic dependencies.
Nevertheless, institutions holding or processing digital assets must consider what happens if a network cannot migrate at the same pace as the systems connected to it. A regulated custodian may strengthen its internal security while remaining dependent on an external network whose underlying cryptography has not changed.
These dependencies complicate the assessment of quantum readiness. An organisation’s internal migration plan cannot by itself establish that every service or financial asset it relies on will remain protected.
Crypto agility may reduce repeated disruption
International standardisation work has produced cryptographic algorithms designed to resist attacks from both conventional and quantum computers. Their availability provides a technical basis for migration, although organisations still need to assess implementation, compatibility and operational resilience.
Certes argues that institutions should develop crypto agility, allowing them to change cryptographic mechanisms without repeatedly rebuilding applications or replacing entire infrastructure environments.
The approach recognises that post-quantum migration may not be the final change required. Standards can evolve, research may identify weaknesses in particular algorithms and organisations may need to adopt different protection methods as technology develops.
Systems designed around replaceable cryptographic components may be easier to adapt than applications whose encryption and authentication functions are tightly embedded within the software.
Achieving that flexibility requires architectural decisions and testing. Organisations must understand which components can be changed independently and whether connected systems can continue communicating securely when different algorithms are introduced.
Pamplin also identifies sovereign key ownership as an important consideration, arguing that financial institutions should retain direct control over the cryptographic keys protecting their most sensitive information.
Cloud and other external service arrangements can complicate those responsibilities because information may be stored or processed through infrastructure operated by several suppliers. Institutions need clarity about who generates, holds, accesses and manages the keys used to protect their records.
Key control and quantum resistance are separate requirements. An institution can own its encryption keys while relying on an algorithm vulnerable to future attacks, while adopting a quantum-resistant algorithm does not automatically resolve weaknesses in how keys are stored or administered.
Effective protection consequently depends on suitable cryptographic methods and appropriate management of the credentials and keys on which those methods rely.
Regulators are developing different responses
IOSCO’s international report coincides with guidance published on 19 November by the Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority. The UK document identifies effective practices for managing quantum-related cybersecurity risks, including governance, inventories, migration planning and coordination with suppliers.
The UK material is explicitly non-binding and separate from the authorities’ formal consultation on general cyber resilience. It provides practical approaches for organisations operating within the UK financial system rather than establishing a compulsory post-quantum migration deadline.
IOSCO is addressing a wider international market, where the difficulties include differences between national approaches and dependencies connecting financial institutions across jurisdictions.
Its report also raises concerns about quantum washing, in which companies exaggerate the maturity or capabilities of quantum technology when promoting products or investments. Such claims can create investor protection risks even before quantum computing becomes commercially established within financial services.
That issue requires a different form of scrutiny from cybersecurity migration. Regulators must assess whether businesses accurately describe current capabilities while also preparing for security threats associated with future developments.
IOSCO intends to continue work on quantum-related financial market risks in 2027, with an emphasis on industry awareness, international coordination and preparedness. The organisation has not imposed a common migration deadline or established a single timetable for the emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers.
Financial institutions nevertheless face substantial preparation requirements because the transition may extend across many applications, suppliers and market connections. Establishing cryptographic inventories, assessing the sensitivity of information and testing replacement technologies can begin before the precise date of a future quantum threat is known.
The industry’s progress will depend on whether those activities move beyond preliminary assessments into coordinated migration programmes that preserve the availability and integrity of financial services. IOSCO’s findings indicate that much of that work remains at an early stage, while the infrastructure requiring attention is already in operation.












