Summary
- The Bank of England, PRA and FCA published non-binding effective practices addressing quantum-related cybersecurity risks on 19 November.
- The document covers board oversight, cryptographic inventories, harvest-now-decrypt-later risks, migration planning, crypto agility and coordination with suppliers.
- The practices are separate from the regulators' formal cyber resilience consultation and do not impose a new mandatory migration timetable.
UK financial regulators have published detailed practices for preparing banks, insurers and financial market infrastructure for future quantum computing threats, urging organisations to examine cryptographic dependencies before advances in computing undermine widely used security mechanisms. The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority have identified practical measures spanning governance, risk assessment, software migration and coordination with technology suppliers.
The document, published on 19 November, addresses the potential emergence of cryptographically relevant quantum computers capable of defeating certain mathematical protections used in financial communications and digital transactions. The regulators explicitly acknowledge that no such computers are currently known to exist and that their development timetable remains uncertain.
Unlike the separate consultation on general cyber resilience, the quantum publication does not form part of the authorities’ formal supervisory expectations. Its effective practices are non-binding and are intended to help firms prepare proportionately according to their size, complexity and risk profile.
The distinction allows organisations to use the material as a practical reference without treating every recommendation as an immediately enforceable requirement. Nevertheless, the document identifies a substantial planning problem because cryptographic mechanisms are embedded across financial technology systems that can remain operational for many years.
Cryptographic inventories reveal the scale of migration
Financial institutions use cryptography to protect data, authenticate users and systems, establish secure communications and validate digital signatures. These functions are distributed across applications, databases, networks, certificates and other infrastructure rather than confined to a single security platform.
The regulators recommend that firms consider building an inventory of the cryptographic methods and assets used throughout their technology environments. Such an inventory can help identify which algorithms may become vulnerable to future quantum attacks and which business services depend on them.
The work can be complicated by legacy applications and components supplied by external providers. A financial institution may operate software whose cryptographic functions are not immediately visible to the teams responsible for managing the business process it supports.
Modern systems can present similar difficulties because external libraries, cloud services and application programming interfaces may introduce cryptographic dependencies managed by other organisations.
The regulators identify applications, backups, operational technology and public key infrastructure among the areas requiring consideration. Their guidance encourages firms to maintain an understanding of the connections between these components and the services they protect.
That information provides the basis for prioritising migration. An organisation cannot reliably determine which systems require early action if it does not know which algorithms they use or how difficult those systems will be to change.
Long-lived information creates exposure before quantum attacks arrive
One concern involves the possibility of harvest-now-decrypt-later attacks. An adversary could collect encrypted data using current techniques and retain it until future computing capabilities make it possible to defeat the protections that originally kept the information confidential.
Some financial information remains sensitive long after it is created. Customer records, commercially valuable transaction details and confidential business communications may require protection for periods extending beyond the expected lifetime of a particular system.
The regulators recommend assessing information according to its sensitivity, potential value to attackers and required confidentiality period. Data requiring protection for many years may justify earlier attention than information whose value declines quickly.
Planning must also distinguish between different cryptographic mechanisms. Quantum computing poses particular concerns for widely deployed public-key techniques, while other forms of encryption and hashing face different technical considerations.
Replacing vulnerable algorithms is consequently a more precise task than assuming that every existing form of encryption will become unusable simultaneously. Firms need to understand where individual methods are employed and how they interact with the systems around them.
Future quantum capabilities cannot be dated reliably. The regulators cite expert assessments suggesting that cryptographically relevant quantum computers may emerge within a period relevant to long-term financial technology planning, while cautioning against reliance on one forecast.
Boards must oversee a multi-year programme
The publication recommends that boards and senior managers consider quantum readiness within established cyber risk and resilience arrangements. A migration programme may require investment in software, equipment, specialist staff and changes to supplier relationships over several years.
Management oversight should therefore extend beyond approving a general commitment to post-quantum cryptography. Firms may need defined responsibilities, migration priorities, milestones and information showing whether critical systems are progressing towards suitable protection.
The regulators suggest reporting on the completeness of cryptographic inventories, the identification of priority applications and the preparedness of material third parties.
Such reporting can help management understand whether delays arise from internal technology constraints, unavailable supplier upgrades or the need to coordinate changes with other financial organisations.
The proposed approach also recognises that business functions have a role in identifying essential services and sensitive information. Technology teams can assess algorithms and infrastructure, but determining the consequences of a failure may require knowledge of payments, customer services, settlement processes and other financial activities.
Replacement algorithms must work under operational conditions
International standards for post-quantum cryptography provide alternatives intended to resist attacks from conventional and quantum computers. However, adopting them can involve changes to software, protocols, hardware and the systems exchanging protected information.
The regulators suggest a phased approach, prioritising sensitive data and critical services while evaluating the operational effects of new methods. Where older applications cannot support updated cryptography, firms may need to replace, retire or otherwise manage those systems.
Transitional approaches can involve hybrid cryptography, combining existing methods with quantum-resistant algorithms. Such arrangements may reduce particular risks during migration, although the document cautions that they should be assessed carefully and not treated as a substitute for progressing towards appropriate long-term protection.
The publication also recommends considering crypto agility, allowing organisations to change algorithms as threats, technology and standards evolve. This is relevant because the adoption of a new cryptographic method does not guarantee that it will remain suitable indefinitely.
Testing must examine more than whether a replacement algorithm functions in isolation. Updated systems need to communicate reliably with connected applications and external parties without introducing unacceptable performance or security problems.
Organisations may also need to test how changes can be reversed when they fail. The regulators caution against recovery arrangements that unintentionally restore outdated cryptography and thereby recreate the vulnerabilities the migration was intended to address.
Financial infrastructure requires coordinated changes
Post-quantum migration is not exclusively an internal technology project because financial services depend on shared protocols and external suppliers. A bank may upgrade its own systems while remaining connected to another organisation that uses incompatible cryptographic methods.
The regulators encourage firms to understand material suppliers’ migration plans and assess whether their timelines are compatible with the institution’s own requirements.
Procurement and contractual arrangements may need to address the cryptographic capabilities of products and the processes through which suppliers will introduce updates. This is particularly relevant for systems expected to remain in service for many years.
Coordination may also be necessary across financial market infrastructure, counterparties and common service providers. Changes affecting authentication or transaction verification could disrupt essential services if connected organisations migrate without adequate compatibility testing.
The guidance emphasises that institutions remain accountable for managing quantum-related cyber risks even where relevant technology is supplied by third parties. Outsourcing a service does not remove the need to understand its vulnerabilities or the consequences of a delayed supplier upgrade.
The authorities also recognise that quantum readiness cannot be completed through a single migration exercise. Firms may need to update inventories, reassess algorithms and revise plans as technical progress and standards change.
The publication provides a practical UK supervisory reference without establishing a fixed deadline for replacing cryptographic systems. Its emphasis is on preparing the information, governance and coordination necessary for migration before future quantum capabilities make those changes more urgent and difficult to deliver safely.












