Summary
- The Bank of England, PRA and FCA have issued CP17/26 and GC26/9, consulting on guidance that clarifies existing cyber risk and resilience requirements.
- The draft addresses board accountability, critical asset inventories, layered protection, incident detection, recovery and regular testing.
- The consultation closes on 26 February 2027, with final guidance expected during the first half of 2027.
Britain’s financial regulators are proposing clearer guidance on how banks, insurers and other regulated businesses should manage cybersecurity and recover from serious incidents, bringing established obligations into a more consistent supervisory framework. The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority have opened a joint consultation covering the governance, protection and recovery arrangements supporting essential financial services.
Published on 19 November as CP17/26 and GC26/9, the proposed guidance explains how firms should meet requirements that already exist within the regulatory framework. The authorities are not proposing additional binding rules, instead seeking greater clarity about the controls, management responsibilities and evidence expected of organisations operating increasingly interconnected technology systems.
The consultation closes on 26 February 2027, with final guidance expected during the first half of next year. It applies principally to organisations covered by the regulators’ existing operational resilience requirements, including major banks, insurers and specified financial market participants.
Its publication follows increasing concern about the volume and sophistication of cyber threats. The regulators report that October 2026 recorded the second-highest number of cyber incidents notified to the FCA during the preceding five years, with the monthly total 52% above a previous 18-month peak recorded in May 2025.
Cyber risk becomes a board responsibility
The proposed guidance places particular emphasis on management accountability. Firms are expected to establish clear responsibility for cybersecurity, supported by board and senior management oversight, defined risk appetite and regular information about the effectiveness of their controls.
Cybersecurity often involves specialist technical teams, but decisions about resources, risk tolerance and operational priorities extend beyond those teams. An organisation may need to choose between upgrading vulnerable systems, replacing external providers or accepting temporary limitations while more substantial technology changes are completed.
Such decisions can affect customers and the availability of important services, making oversight a management responsibility rather than a purely technical matter. The FCA’s draft guidance specifies the importance of a named senior manager with responsibility for cyber risk, alongside wider board accountability.
Effective reporting should allow management to understand the condition of critical systems rather than rely exclusively on broad descriptions of security activity. Measures covering unresolved vulnerabilities, incident response capability and significant supplier dependencies may be more useful than reporting the number of security tools deployed.
The authorities are drawing on supervisory experience to clarify these expectations, recognising that regulated firms differ considerably in size, complexity and the risks associated with their activities. The proposed approach is intended to remain proportionate rather than require every institution to use an identical technical architecture.
Asset inventories provide the foundation for resilience
A recurring requirement concerns the identification of critical technology infrastructure and the dependencies supporting important business services. Organisations need accurate records of their applications, systems, data, networks and external providers before they can assess how an incident might affect operations.
Such inventories can be difficult to maintain as technology environments change. Financial institutions may operate older applications alongside cloud platforms and specialist external services, with connections introduced through successive projects and supplier relationships.
A system that appears relatively unimportant when considered independently may support authentication, communication or information processing for several essential applications. Its failure could therefore create a much larger disruption than the apparent function of the component suggests.
The regulators want firms to map these relationships and consider the potential consequences of cyber incidents across the services they provide. That work extends established operational resilience principles, under which relevant organisations must identify important business services and establish tolerances for disruption.
Accurate mapping also helps firms identify where third-party suppliers create concentrations of risk. Two different applications may depend on the same cloud provider, network connection or management system, meaning they are not operationally independent even if they have separate business owners.
The presence of a supplier contract does not guarantee resilience. Institutions need to understand which services depend on the provider and whether workable recovery arrangements exist when it becomes unavailable.
Protection and detection require practical testing
The draft guidance covers layered technical protections, including secure system configuration, vulnerability and patch management, identity controls and protection of sensitive information.
These measures are intended to reduce the likelihood and consequences of attacks, although no combination can guarantee that an intrusion or technology failure will never occur. Controls must therefore be supported by monitoring and incident detection arrangements that allow organisations to identify suspicious behaviour promptly.
The regulators emphasise the importance of defined alerting and escalation processes. A security system may generate warnings without providing effective protection if staff cannot distinguish serious incidents from routine activity or do not know how to coordinate an appropriate response.
Testing can reveal weaknesses in these arrangements before an actual attack occurs. Exercises may examine how quickly suspicious activity is detected, whether decision-makers receive sufficient information and whether affected systems can be isolated without causing unnecessary disruption.
The proposed guidance aligns with the National Cyber Security Centre’s Cyber Assessment Framework, providing firms with an established reference for evaluating cyber risk management and resilience.
Alignment does not mean that every organisation should implement identical technical controls. Different services present different risks, and the effectiveness of a measure depends on the systems, information and operational processes it is intended to protect.
Recovery remains central to the regulatory approach
Financial institutions must plan for incidents that defeat preventative controls. Malware, compromised credentials, vulnerabilities in external software and failures affecting shared infrastructure can all create disruption despite substantial security investment.
Response arrangements need to establish who can make decisions, how affected systems are contained and which business services should receive priority during recovery.
Those decisions can be difficult where several critical activities depend on the same technology. Isolating a compromised network may reduce the risk of further intrusion while preventing employees or customers from accessing legitimate services.
Recovery testing should therefore examine how essential functions can continue or be restored within the limits established by the firm’s operational resilience arrangements. Technical restoration is one part of that process, but institutions must also consider the integrity of information and the ability of customers to complete important activities.
Lessons from previous incidents can improve preparation, particularly where investigations reveal undocumented dependencies or weaknesses in communication between internal teams and external providers.
Scope and regulatory status require careful interpretation
The FCA identifies several categories of organisation for which the proposed guidance is particularly relevant, including UK banks, building societies, designated investment firms, Solvency II insurers and certain payment and electronic money businesses.
Its scope also includes specified investment exchanges and other financial services organisations, while certain smaller or differently regulated firms fall outside the formal application of the guidance. Those organisations may still find the material useful as a reference for their own cybersecurity arrangements.
The consultation does not establish a new regulatory regime or impose a fresh set of requirements on every financial business. Instead, it clarifies how existing obligations should be interpreted in a cyber context.
The regulators have separately issued effective practices addressing artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Those documents are not part of the formal consultation and do not themselves establish binding supervisory expectations.
Responses to CP17/26 and GC26/9 will inform the final guidance expected in 2027. Financial institutions will then have a clearer account of how supervisors intend to assess governance, critical technology dependencies and operational recovery within the rules already applying to their activities.












