Summary
- European telecom executives are seeking changes to the proposed Digital Networks Act, including stronger spectrum rights and more flexibility over network migration.
- Operators are separately challenging supplier-removal provisions proposed under the revised Cybersecurity Act.
- Both files remain under negotiation, leaving legislators to balance infrastructure investment, competition, and supply-chain security.
Seventeen European telecom chief executives are pressing Brussels to change proposed network and cybersecurity rules, arguing that investment in fibre, 5G, and future 6G systems will be harder if operators face uncertain spectrum rights and expensive supplier changes at the same time. The intervention, coordinated by Connect Europe, brings together executives from major operators as two separate pieces of EU legislation move through negotiations. The industry’s objections span investment policy and security policy rather than one combined legislative proposal.
The first file is the Digital Networks Act, proposed by the European Commission as a replacement for substantial parts of the existing telecom framework. The Commission wants more harmonised rules across the single market, longer spectrum licences, easier cross-border operation, and national planning for the retirement of older copper networks. Operators broadly support simplification but are pushing for stronger spectrum rights and greater flexibility around network migration.
Industry representatives also want legislators to reconsider obligations that they say could limit investment certainty or impose deadlines poorly suited to national market conditions. Spectrum duration matters because mobile infrastructure has a long payback period, while decisions about copper retirement affect wholesale services, customers, and capital spending across fixed networks. Operators are therefore seeking rules that give them more discretion over how and when older infrastructure is replaced.
A separate dispute concerns the proposed revision of the EU Cybersecurity Act and the treatment of suppliers considered a security risk. Connect Europe argues that mandatory removal of designated high-risk equipment could cost the sector as much as €40 billion, although that figure is an industry estimate rather than a Commission assessment. The operators’ case is that capital spent replacing functioning equipment is capital unavailable for expanding coverage or capacity.
Security policy lands inside network economics
The two files address different policy problems even though they meet inside the same networks. The Digital Networks Act is concerned with market structure, connectivity regulation, and investment conditions, whereas the revised Cybersecurity Act is intended to strengthen the EU’s approach to technology supply-chain risk. Telecom operators consequently face one debate about how they build and monetise infrastructure and another about which suppliers can remain part of that infrastructure.
Replacing installed network equipment is materially different from changing an office software subscription because radio-access and core systems are integrated into long-lived physical estates. Replacement programmes involve procurement, interoperability testing, site access, engineering work, spare parts, and migration risk alongside the price of new hardware. Techopia has previously examined those economics through Spain’s changing Huawei exposure, where security policy runs directly into the cost of equipment already deployed.
The Commission’s argument starts from a different assessment of risk. European authorities have spent years warning that dependence on certain suppliers can create strategic and security exposure extending well beyond the initial purchase price. A stronger common framework is intended to reduce inconsistent implementation between member states and give supply-chain security more direct legal consequences.
The connectivity proposal responds to a separate concern that Europe’s telecom market remains fragmented across national licensing and regulatory systems while many digital services operate across borders. Longer spectrum terms and simpler operating arrangements are intended to improve investment certainty, but operators argue that the proposal does not remove enough friction. The disagreement is therefore over the conditions attached to investment rather than whether Europe needs more network capacity.
Infrastructure policy is becoming harder to compartmentalise
AI workloads, cloud services, industrial digitisation, and new data-centre capacity are increasing demand for fixed and mobile connectivity while operators are simultaneously expected to improve coverage and strengthen cyber resilience. European industrial policy also places greater emphasis on technological sovereignty and security of supply, preventing procurement decisions from being evaluated solely through short-term equipment cost. Those objectives can reinforce one another, but they can also compete for the same capital budget.
Restricting a supplier may reduce one category of strategic risk while accelerating replacement spending, just as longer spectrum rights may improve investment certainty while reducing the frequency with which governments revisit allocation decisions. Neither trade-off disappears because one side describes its preferred outcome as security or simplification. Legislators will have to decide which risks should be absorbed by operators, consumers, governments, or equipment suppliers.
Both legislative files remain subject to negotiation between EU institutions, leaving substantial scope for amendments before final rules are agreed. Connect Europe’s intervention is therefore part of a lobbying process rather than evidence that the industry’s preferred changes will be adopted. The eventual framework will influence not only who can supply Europe’s networks, but the way operators divide capital between replacement, resilience, coverage, and new capacity.












