Belgian prosecutors have detained a former senior researcher at BelGaN over allegations that sensitive gallium nitride semiconductor technology was transferred to a Chinese chip company, turning the collapse of a small European manufacturer into a wider test of how the continent protects industrial know-how.

The 52-year-old Belgian-Chinese suspect was arrested at Brussels Airport on 10 May while preparing to travel to Beijing and has remained detained as authorities investigate suspected industrial espionage, misuse of company assets, and unlawful disclosure of trade secrets. Prosecutors suspect that, while holding a senior position at BelGaN, he was also involved with a Chinese semiconductor company operating in a similar field. He denies the allegations, and a second person linked to the investigation is being sought.

BelGaN specialised in gallium nitride, or GaN, semiconductor technology, which can switch electrical power more efficiently than conventional silicon in demanding applications. The material is commercially important in electric vehicles and power electronics, while its characteristics also make it relevant to aerospace, satellites, radar, and electronic-warfare systems, placing the investigation at the junction between industrial competition and national security.

Although the criminal case will turn on evidence gathered by Belgian authorities, its industrial context is already instructive. BelGaN filed for bankruptcy in July 2024 after failing to secure the capital required to move its Oudenaarde production towards GaN technology, leaving hundreds of workers affected and a body of semiconductor expertise attached to a company that could no longer finance its transition.

A strategic technology inside a failed business

BelGaN had taken over semiconductor production and research facilities previously operated by Onsemi and was attempting to shift from established silicon manufacturing towards gallium nitride. European Parliament material relating to support for displaced workers recorded that the company made an €8.3 million net loss on €55 million of revenue in 2023, while high energy, chemical, and labour costs compounded the difficulty of funding a capital-intensive technology change.

The bankruptcy ultimately affected more than 400 workers, making the case an employment and regional-industrial problem before it became an alleged espionage investigation. Yet the two issues are connected because advanced manufacturing knowledge often resides not only in patents and files but in specialised teams, production processes, supplier relationships, and engineering experience, all of which become harder to protect or retain when an industrial business enters distress.

That creates a gap in Europe’s technology-sovereignty agenda. Policy has increasingly focused on attracting semiconductor investment, subsidising production capacity, and reducing dependence on overseas supply, although safeguarding valuable intellectual property becomes equally important when European ventures fail, restructure, seek emergency finance, or change ownership.

The European Commission’s proposed Chips Act 2.0, published in June, explicitly treats semiconductors as strategic infrastructure for AI, cloud computing, connected vehicles, robotics, drones, and other critical technologies. It seeks to reduce strategic dependencies and strengthen both advanced and mainstream chip production after the original Chips Act helped mobilise more than €52 billion in public and private investment.

Economic security reaches the factory floor

As Europe tries to build a more resilient semiconductor base, industrial security is becoming harder to separate from ordinary corporate governance. Research access, employee conflicts, foreign investment, joint ventures, supplier relationships, data handling, and the movement of specialist staff can all become routes through which know-how leaves an organisation, even when the underlying technology is not subject to the same controls as the most advanced computing chips.

Gallium nitride illustrates why strategic importance is not limited to leading-edge processors used to train AI models. Power semiconductors affect how efficiently electric vehicles, data infrastructure, communications equipment, industrial systems, and defence electronics operate, meaning a relatively small European manufacturer can hold technology with significance far beyond its revenue or workforce.

The Commission has increasingly described semiconductor resilience in terms of security, traceability, confidentiality, and reduced reliance on foreign supply chains. Those objectives will be difficult to achieve if economic-security mechanisms concentrate only on major acquisitions and fabrication projects while paying less attention to distressed businesses whose research may remain valuable after their balance sheets have failed.

There is also a commercial tension in attempting to protect technology while keeping Europe open to international capital, customers, and research collaboration. Semiconductor manufacturing requires substantial funding and global supply relationships, and companies seeking to scale cannot simply retreat behind national boundaries. Stronger safeguards therefore have to distinguish legitimate investment and technology cooperation from conduct that crosses into unlawful transfer or espionage.

The Belgian proceedings will determine what happened at BelGaN and whether the allegations can be proven. Beyond the case itself, the sequence is unusually revealing: a company developing a strategically important chip technology failed financially, and the technology it left behind is now at the centre of an alleged espionage investigation. Semiconductor sovereignty becomes considerably harder when valuable capability is at its most exposed just as the company holding it is at its weakest.