BATM Advanced Communications has received the first commercial order for a tactical encryption platform developed to protect military-grade communications as governments and critical organisations prepare for the eventual impact of quantum computing on existing cryptography.

The order is worth approximately $1.6 million and follows a proof of concept delivered during the first half of 2026 for a long-standing customer. BATM expects to supply the hardware during the current year, moving the product from a development programme into an initial operational contract.

The London and Tel Aviv-listed company describes the system as hardware based and “quantum-era-ready”, although it has not identified the customer, disclosed the algorithms employed, or stated which government, military, or independent security standards the platform has passed.

Those omissions limit the conclusions that can be drawn from the first order, particularly in a market where terms such as quantum safe, quantum ready, and post-quantum are used with varying technical precision. The contract nevertheless provides firmer evidence than a prototype announcement because a customer has completed an evaluation and committed to an initial supply agreement.

Encryption migration has already begun

The risk addressed by post-quantum cryptography arises from the possibility that a sufficiently capable quantum computer could break public-key algorithms used to establish secure connections and verify digital signatures. Such a machine does not yet exist, but encrypted information stolen today may remain sensitive long enough to be decrypted later.

Security agencies are therefore treating migration as a long-term technology programme rather than a response to a single future breakthrough. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has set an indicative timetable under which organisations should complete discovery and initial planning by 2028, undertake their highest-priority migrations by 2031, and move all systems, services, and products by 2035.

The US National Institute of Standards and Technology published its first three post-quantum cryptography standards in August 2024, giving product developers agreed algorithms for key establishment and digital signatures. Implementation remains more complicated than exchanging one cryptographic library for another, because encryption is embedded in hardware, firmware, identity systems, certificates, network protocols, and operating procedures.

Tactical communications add further constraints. Equipment may need to operate with limited power and bandwidth, survive hostile physical conditions, maintain low latency, and interoperate with older systems used by allies or other units. Larger keys, signatures, or computational requirements can therefore affect whether an algorithm that works in a data centre is practical in deployed equipment.

BATM has not published enough technical information to establish how its platform handles those trade-offs. Nor has it said whether the system uses NIST-standardised post-quantum algorithms, a hybrid design combining conventional and post-quantum methods, or another approach intended to support later upgrades.

Hardware strengthens and complicates security

A dedicated encryption appliance can protect cryptographic keys and isolate sensitive processing from general-purpose computing systems. It can also provide predictable performance and tightly controlled interfaces, which are valuable in military or mission-critical networks.

Hardware has a longer replacement cycle than ordinary software, making cryptographic agility especially important. A platform procured now may remain in operation for many years, during which standards, implementation guidance, and knowledge of algorithmic weaknesses could change.

A credible quantum-era design therefore needs a route for updating algorithms without replacing the entire device, alongside controls ensuring that updates cannot introduce malicious code or weaken interoperability. BATM’s announcement does not explain whether the new platform is field-upgradable or how it manages cryptographic transitions.

“We are delighted to have received this first order for our new tactical quantum-era-ready encryption platform,” Moti Nagar, chief executive of BATM, said in the regulatory announcement.

The order forms part of BATM’s effort to expand its cybersecurity business alongside its network-infrastructure operations. Its 2025 results indicated that the pipeline across BATM Networks and BATM Cyber had reached its highest level in several years, with average order sizes more than doubling.

An initial contract of $1.6 million remains small in relation to major defence communications programmes, and BATM has not said whether it expects follow-on orders from the same customer or wider procurement from other organisations. Delivery during 2026 will provide the first test of whether the proof of concept can be manufactured, integrated, and accepted within an operational timetable.

Procurement evidence needs technical evidence

Post-quantum security products are entering a market in which buyers must make decisions before the threat can be demonstrated against production systems. Waiting for a cryptographically relevant quantum computer would leave insufficient time to discover vulnerable assets, replace infrastructure, and preserve the confidentiality of long-lived information.

Urgency also creates room for imprecise claims. Buyers need to distinguish products implementing recognised post-quantum standards from systems using quantum key distribution, random-number generation, proprietary algorithms, or conventional cryptography packaged under quantum-era language.

For military and critical-infrastructure customers, assurance will depend on algorithm selection, secure implementation, side-channel resistance, key management, update mechanisms, physical protection, and interoperability. A product can employ a robust mathematical algorithm while remaining vulnerable through flawed hardware or operational design.

BATM’s first order establishes that one customer has moved beyond evaluation, but it does not establish the platform as a wider standard or reveal the strength of its technical assurance. Further contracts, certification details, and delivery evidence will determine whether the product becomes a meaningful part of post-quantum migration or remains a specialist project for one buyer.