Summary
- The Treasury has designated five additional critical third parties, taking the UK total to nine.
- The new designations take effect on 23 November, under joint oversight by the Bank of England, PRA and FCA.
- The regime addresses systemic operational resilience, while regulated financial institutions retain responsibility for managing their suppliers.
Five additional suppliers of financial technology and infrastructure will come under direct UK regulatory oversight from 23 November, extending a regime designed to reduce the consequences of disruption affecting services used across the financial system.
HM Treasury has designated BlackRock Financial Management, Bloomberg, Bottomline Technologies, Broadridge Financial Solutions and Form3 UK as critical third parties, bringing the total number of designated suppliers to nine.
The Bank of England, Prudential Regulation Authority and Financial Conduct Authority will jointly oversee the systemically important services provided by the additional companies. The designations were announced on 17 November, with the relevant amendment regulations taking effect six days later.
The expansion moves the framework beyond major cloud computing providers into financial information, investment technology, payments and transaction-processing infrastructure.
Financial services depend on shared technology
Many banks, insurers, investment firms and other financial institutions use external suppliers to provide technology that would be expensive or impractical to develop independently.
These arrangements can offer access to specialist expertise, established software and infrastructure serving multiple organisations. However, extensive reliance on common suppliers also creates dependencies that can extend beyond an individual financial institution.
BlackRock Financial Management provides investment technology associated with its Aladdin platform, while Bloomberg supplies market information, analytics and other services used throughout the financial sector.
Bottomline develops payments and financial process technology, Broadridge provides financial market and transaction infrastructure, and Form3 operates cloud-native payment technology.
The named companies perform different activities, but the underlying regulatory concern is similar: disruption to a sufficiently important shared service could affect multiple firms and potentially threaten confidence in the financial system.
That assessment does not imply that the suppliers have committed misconduct or experienced a particular operational failure. Designation is based on the potential systemic consequences of disruption rather than a finding of wrongdoing.
Nor does the designation automatically mean that every product offered by a named company carries the same level of systemic importance. Regulatory oversight concentrates on services capable of creating wider financial risks.
The regime expands beyond cloud computing
The first four suppliers designated under the framework were Amazon Web Services EMEA, Google Cloud EMEA, Microsoft Ireland Operations and Oracle Corporation UK.
Their designations took effect on 13 July 2026, establishing direct regulatory oversight of major technology providers whose services are used across the UK financial sector.
Cloud platforms can support numerous institutions simultaneously, making their resilience important even where individual customers maintain separate systems and contractual arrangements.
However, financial institutions also depend on specialised providers for information and processes directly connected to trading, investment and payments.
A failure affecting payment infrastructure could interrupt transactions across several organisations, while problems with a widely used market information system may interfere with activities that depend on timely and consistent data.
The precise consequences would vary according to the service affected, the duration of disruption and the alternatives available to individual customers.
Some organisations may maintain backup providers or contingency procedures, but these arrangements can become more difficult to operate when an incident affects many institutions at the same time.
Shared suppliers may also depend on other technology businesses for computing infrastructure, network services or security capabilities, creating additional connections between apparently separate financial operations.
Understanding those dependencies requires information that individual customer contracts may not reveal in full.
Regulators gain visibility of systemic services
The critical third-party framework was established through the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, with detailed supervisory rules introduced subsequently.
Historically, financial regulators have addressed much of the risk associated with external suppliers through obligations imposed on regulated institutions.
Those institutions must assess their outsourcing arrangements, identify important business services and establish appropriate plans for responding to operational disruption.
Direct supervision of critical third parties complements this approach by allowing regulators to examine risks associated with certain suppliers at the level of the shared service.
The Bank of England, PRA and FCA can coordinate information gathering, supervisory engagement and resilience assessments. The framework also provides mechanisms for intervention where designated suppliers fail to comply with applicable requirements.
Regulatory attention can extend to governance arrangements, operational risk management, incident handling and the ability to continue or restore important services during disruption.
The additional designations become effective on 23 November. Until then, the five companies should not be described as already subject to the new obligations by virtue of the November regulations.
For suppliers, direct oversight may require additional evidence about technical arrangements and recovery capabilities. Their existing customers may also seek clarity about how regulatory supervision interacts with contractual assurance and operational testing.
Financial institutions retain responsibility
The framework does not transfer responsibility for operational resilience away from banks and other regulated businesses using the designated services.
According to the FCA, existing outsourcing and operational resilience obligations continue to apply even where a supplier becomes directly subject to regulatory oversight.
Institutions must still identify which activities depend on external technology, consider the consequences of disruption and maintain suitable contingency arrangements.
They may need to determine whether an alternative service is genuinely capable of supporting essential operations or whether apparent supplier diversity conceals a shared infrastructure dependency.
Contractual access to information, incident notification arrangements and the ability to recover data can remain important considerations even where a supplier is subject to direct supervision.
Similarly, designation cannot guarantee uninterrupted service. Regulatory monitoring can improve visibility and encourage stronger safeguards, but equipment failures, software defects and other incidents may still occur.
Individual financial institutions also remain responsible for problems arising from their own system configurations, integration choices and internal access controls.
Further designations remain possible
The Treasury expects the number of critical third parties to remain relatively small, reflecting the framework’s concentration on suppliers whose disruption could have consequences beyond their immediate customers.
Further designations may be considered as the financial technology market evolves and new dependencies become significant.
Increasing use of shared payment platforms, cloud infrastructure and specialised data services means that systemic risks may not correspond neatly with the conventional boundaries between individual financial institutions.
Direct oversight gives regulators another mechanism for examining those connections while retaining the obligations placed on firms that purchase external services.
The designation of BlackRock Financial Management, Bloomberg, Bottomline, Broadridge and Form3 marks the first substantial expansion beyond the original cloud supplier group.
From 23 November, the framework will cover a broader range of financial infrastructure, with its effectiveness depending on whether coordinated supervision improves understanding of shared dependencies and the ability of essential services to withstand disruption.












